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Abstract
With increasingly ambitious initiatives such as GENI and FIND that seek to design future internets, it becomes imperative to define the
characteristics of robust topologies, and build future networks optimized for robustness. This paper investigates the characteristics of network
topologies that maintain a high level of throughput in spite of multiple attacks. To this end, we select network topologies belonging to the
main network models and some real world networks. We consider three types of attacks: removal of random nodes, high degree nodes, and
high betweenness nodes. We use elasticity as our robustness measure and, through our analysis, illustrate that different topologies can have
different degrees of robustness. In particular, elasticity can fall as low as 0.8% of the upper bound based on the attack employed. This result
substantiates the need for optimized network topology design. Furthermore, we implement a tradeoff function that combines elasticity under
the three attack strategies and considers the cost of the network. Our extensive simulations show that, for a given network density, regular and
semi-regular topologies can have higher degrees of robustness than heterogeneous topologies, and that link redundancy is a sufficient but not
necessary condition for robustness.
Key words: Complex Networks, Robustness, Optimization, Attack, Tradeoff, Topology, Heterogeneity, Characteristic Path Length
1. Introduction
Why study future network topologies? For one, we have ex-
perienced several moderate sized failures and thus, large fail-
ures are inevitable. In particular, the 2006 earthquake in Tai-
wan disrupted undersea fiber optic communication lines and as
a result, banks from South Korea to Australia suffered massive
interruptions [1]. Though this represents a direct network fail-
ure, failures can also occur indirectly. For example Code Red, a
computer virus that incapacitated numerous networks, resulted
in a global loss of 2 billion US dollars [2]. Furthermore, in
2004, Sassar virus disruptions accounted for the halt on mar-
itime operations in the UK, the halt on railway operations in
Australia, and interruptions in hospital facilities in Hong Kong
[3]. The US General Accounting Office estimated 250,000 an-
nual attacks on Department of Defense networks [4]. Objectives
range from theft to immobilization of entire networks. Another
riveting example stems from a series of cascading failures in
2003 that resulted in a blackout in the Northeastern states [5].
A similar phenomenon occurred the very same year in Italy,
and left 56 million residents without power for 9 hours [6]. Our
daily routines would cease to exist should network topologies
disintegrate. Thus, as failures and attacks increase, it is im-
perative to design future topologies robust against unforeseen
catastrophes for future network initiatives.
Amongst other definitions, a network can be robust if discon-
necting components is difficult. However, we define robustness
as the ability of a network to maintain its total throughput un-
der node and link removal. The former definition is based on
topological characteristics, while the latter also considers flows
within the network such as IP packets.
Approaches for determining the robustness of graphs have
evolved from simple graph theoretic concepts that highlight the
connectivity of a graph [7] to more recent concepts that con-
sider the spectrum of a graph [8]. However, these measures
are unable to capture our definition of robustness. For this rea-
son, we use elasticity as our measure of robustness; it meets
the functional requirements of capturing throughput under node
and link removal.
The importance of this paper stems from our objective to
extract the characteristics of robust networks. With these results,
we seek to produce future robust network topologies. Thus, to
realize our first goal, we 1) use the metric elasticity as a measure
of robustness of a network, 2) establish the upper bound for
elasticity, 3) assess elasticity for diverse network models, 4)
present correlations between elasticity and selected network
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metrics, 5) develop and implement a function that considers
the tradeoff between elasticity and network cost, and 6) extract
characteristics of networks that make them robust.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 re-
views measures of robustness based on the structure and be-
havior of the network. Section 3 presents the network models
from which networks will be selected to assess their elastic-
ity. In Section 4, we review elasticity, our robustness measure,
and provide analytical and numerical approaches to obtain the
upper bound. In Section 5, we assess the elasticity of each net-
work, implement a tradeoff function that considers elasticity
under the three removal strategies and discuss the character-
istics which make a network robust. Finally, we discuss the
benefits and shortcomings of elasticity and highlight our future
initiatives to characterize the robustness of complex networks
in Section 6.
2. Background and Related Work
The classical approach for determining robustness of net-
works entails the use of basic concepts from graph theory. For
instance, the connectivity of a graph is an important, and prob-
ably the earliest, measure of robustness of a network [7]. Node
(link) connectivity, defined as the size of the smallest node
(link) cut, determines in a certain sense the robustness of a
graph to the deletion of nodes (links). However, the node or
link connectivity only partly reflects the ability of graphs to
retain certain degrees of connectedness after deletion. Other
improved measures were introduced and studied, including su-
per connectivity [9], conditional connectivity [10], restricted
connectivity [11], fault diameter [12], toughness [13], scatter-
ing number [14], tenacity [15], expansion parameter [16], and
isoperimetric number [17]. In contrast to node (link) connec-
tivity, these new measures consider both the cost to damage a
network and how badly the network is damaged.
Subsequent measures consider the size of the largest con-
nected component as nodes are attacked [18]. Furthermore, per-
colation models were used to assess the damage incurred by
random graphs [19]. From spectral analysis, experimentalists
consider the second smallest Laplacian eigenvalue as a measure
of how difficult it is to break the network into components [8].
The measures reviewed thus far consider the network struc-
ture to assess robustness. However, more recent efforts have in-
corporated the behavior of the network [20,21]. More precisely,
the authors maximized flows in the network while imposing
constraints on routers and links.
Other metrics in networking literature include the average
node degree [22], betweenness [23], heterogeneity [24], and
characteristic path length [25]. In this paper, our results show
significant corelations between elasticity and some of these
metrics which will be used to characterize the robustness of
networks.
3. Network Models
This section reviews the six models from which 18 topologies
were selected. They include networks from random models,
Watts-Strogatz models, preferential attachment models, near-
regular models, trade-off and optimization models, and real-
world models. For each topology, some of the more common
properties are shown in Table 1.
Table 1
Network characteristics where ASP is the average shortest path and Het is
heterogeneity
Networks ] Nodes ] Links Density Diameter ASP Het
Gi-dense 1000 4505 0.00902 7 3.391 0.331
MySpace 955 10976 0.02409 4 2.013 2.027
Watts-Strogatz 1 1000 3000 0.00601 7 4.14 0.301
PA 2 1000 2964 0.00593 6 3.534 1.109
Gi-sparse 1000 2009 0.00402 12 5.154 0.491
PA 1 1000 1981 0.00397 8 4.177 1.185
Watts-Strogatz 2 1000 2000 0.004 9 5.294 0.37
YouTube 1089 1576 0.00266 12 5.096 1.319
Flickr 967 1515 0.0032 12 4.624 1.394
meshcore 1000 1275 0.00255 3 2.911 3.796
near-regular 2 992 3781 0.00769 31 14.706 0.133
HOT 2 1000 1049 0.0021 12 7.144 1.892
ringcore 1000 1000 0.002 14 8.196 3.122
HOT 1 939 988 0.00224 10 6.812 2.032
PA-sparse 1000 1049 0.0021 14 5.793 1.892
Abilene 886 896 0.00229 10 6.95 2.09
near-regular 1 992 1921 0.00391 61 21 0.089
3.1. Random models
A random graph is obtained by random addition of links
between n vertices. Two notable properties are 1) the average
node degree determines the connectivity of the graph and 2) the
node degree can be approximated using a Poisson distribution.
Erdos-Renyi’s (ER) stochastic model is one of the most studied
of these models. In the construction of an ER graph G(N,E),
E edges are connected at random to N nodes [19]. However,
this paper considers the Gilbert (Gi) modelG(N, p), a modified
version of the ER model where edges are connected to vertices
with a probability of p. For the Gi-dense and Gi-sparse networks
used in this paper, p = 0.0091 and 0.004094 respectively [26].
Figure 1 shows the Gi-sparse network.
3.2. Watts-Strogatz Models
The Watts-Strogatz model is constructed by interpolating
between a regular ring lattice and a random network [19].
Each node is connected to its k nearest neighbors and random
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Fig. 1. The Gi-sparse network with size N = 1000 and average degree
k¯ = 4.018
rewiring occurs with a probability of p. For intermediate values
of p, Watts-Strogatz models produces a Small-world network
which captures the high clustering properties of regular graphs
and the small characteristic path length of random graph mod-
els. For the Watts-Strogatz (W-S) 1 and 2 networks used, the
rewiring probability was 0.3 and 0.5 [26]. Figure 2 shows the
W-S 1 network.
Fig. 2. The W-S 1 network with N = 1000 and k¯ = 4
3.3. Preferential Attachment Models
From their origin, preferential attachment (PA) models have
been considered vulnerable to targeted attacks while robust to
random failures and have a heavy tail distribution [27]. This
model constitutes popular nodes called “hubs” that have a large
number of neighbors compared to other nodes with few neigh-
bors. At each time step, nodes with a higher degree have a
higher probability of attracting new nodes than nodes with a
lower degree. For this work, the PA 1, PA 2, and PA-sparse net-
works were constructed using the Barabasi-Albert Scale-free
model [26,20]. Figure 3 shows the PA-sparse network.
3.4. Near-Regular Models
The near-regular (n-r) networks are best visualized in a pla-
nar, grid-like fashion. The n-r 1 network is composed of a 31
by 32 grid where node i is connected to node j if j is a distance
Fig. 3. The PA-sparse network with N = 1000 and k¯ = 2.098
d = 1 unit: 1 unit is the regular distance among nodes in the
grid. The structure of n-r 2 is similar to that of the regular. How-
ever, in addition to d = 1 unit, all nodes within a distance of
d =
√
2units are connected. Figure 4 shows the n-r 1 network.
Fig. 4. The n-r 1 network with N = 992 and k¯ = 3.87
3.5. Trade-off and Optimization Models
The authors of [28] introduce networks with bimodal de-
gree distributions optimized to minimize the impact of random
attacks. The meshcore and ringcore topologies shown in Fig-
ures 5 and 6 represent this model. The Heuristically Optimized
Trade-off (HOT) network presents a simple model for Inter-
net growth [29,20]. The HOT 1 and 2 networks represent this
model. Figure 7 shows the HOT 2 network.
3.6. Real-World Models
Online social networking connects individuals with common
interests. This paper features the MySpace, YouTube, and Flickr
networks. These networks were obtained via snowball sampling
and have been rescaled [30]. The Abilene network in Figure
8 was built using the Abilene core while customers and peer
networks were each replaced with a gateway router [20].
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Fig. 5. The meshcore network with N = 1000 and k¯ = 2.55
Fig. 6. The ringcore network with N = 1000 and k¯ = 2
Fig. 7. The HOT 2 network with N = 1000 and k¯ = 2.098
4. Robustness Metric
The study of robustness is fundamental to numerous network
research problems using approaches that amplify internal be-
haviors of a network. To this end, we use elasticity as our mea-
sure of robustness, obtain its upper bound and finally, select the
most feasible routing algorithm for elasticity.
4.1. Elasticity
For a network G, having no loops or parallel links, elasticity
E(G) is a measure of the overall robustness. As shown in Figure
9, elasticity is the area under the curve of throughput versus the
Fig. 8. The Abilene network with N = 1000 and k¯ = 2.022
Fig. 9. The evaluation of elasticity
percentage of nodes removed. The throughput is normalized to
compare networks of different magnitudes and at each iteration,
it is recalculated at the removal of each node. Initially, TG (0) =
1 which accounts for the normalized throughput. This value
decreases as kN% of nodes are removed and therefore, elasticity
(E) provides a measure of robustness at any point of node
removal.
Therefore, when ζ nodes have been removed, elasticity can
be computed as
E
(
ζ
N
)
=
1
2N
ζ∑
k=0
(
TG
(
k
N
)
+ TG
(
k + 1
N
))
(1)
where TG( kN ) is the throughput at each interval when k nodes
are removed. N is the total number of nodes in the network
and 0 ≤ ( zeta, k) ≤ N . At each iteration, the throughput is
computed as
TG (t) =
maxρ
∑
i,j Xi,j (t)
α
s.t. LX ≤ B (t) (2)
where t = kN and ρ is a constant used to vary the proportion
of flows in network. α is the unnormalized initial throughput
and Xi,j (t) is the traffic flow between source node i and
destination node j. L is the routing matrix, X is a vector of
all Xi,j (t) flows, and B (t) is a vector of all link bandwidth
capacities.
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4.2. Upper bound for Elasticity
4.2.1. Analytical results
In this section, we consider the mesh network as the topology
which provides the highest elasticity under all attack strategies
for any given network. We assume homogeneous flows where
each flow has a value of 1. Additionally, each link has a capacity
of 1 and Xij (t) can be 1 or 0 depending on whether or not a
flow exists between nodes i and j. With these assumptions, we
proceed to determine the upper bound for elasticity.
Theorem. Given a mesh network with N nodes, and as-
suming homogeneous flows and link capacities of 1, then
limN→∞E(N) = 13 .
Proof. Elasticity can be formulated using both discrete and
continuous approaches. At each iteration when a node is
removed, the throughput is given by
TG (t) =
(N − k) (N − k − 1)
N (N − 1) (3)
where t = kN .
Discrete Elasticity (trapezoidal integration). For a given net-
work of size N , Equation 4 computes elasticity when ζ nodes
have been attacked.
E (ζ) =
1
N
(
1
2
+
ζ−1∑
k=1
β + δ
)
(4)
where β = (N−k)(N−k−1)N(N−1) , δ =
(N−ζ)(N−ζ−1)
2N(N−1) , and
ζ ≤ N − 1. Equation 5 computes the total elasticity for a
network with N nodes when all N nodes are progressively
removed.
E (N) =
1
N
(
1
2
+
ζ−1∑
k=1
(N − k) (N − k − 1)
N (N − 1)
)
(5)
Continuous Elasticity Equation 6 gives the formulation of
elasticity for the continuous case. Similar to the discrete case,
Equation 7 computes elasticity for a given mesh network with
size of N where ζ nodes have been removed and Equation 8
computes the total elasticity for a mesh network with N nodes.
As the size of the network grows, Equation 9 then provides the
upper bound on elasticity when all N nodes are removed.
E (t) =
∫ t
0
TG (τ) dτ, 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 (6)
E (ζ) =
N (N − 1) ζ + 12 (1− 2ζ) ζ2 + 13ζ3
N2 (N − 1) (7)
E (N) =
1
3
− 1
6N
− 1
6N2
(8)
Therefore,
lim
N→∞
E(N) =
1
3
(9)
Q.E.D.
4.2.2. Numerical Results
Figure 10 compares the convergence rate of the discrete and
continuous cases when ζ nodes have been attacked from a net-
work where N = 20. As depicted, both approaches converge
at the onset of node removal.
Fig. 10. Comparison of the convergence rates of elasticity, from Equations 4
and 7, where ζ nodes have been attacked.
Figure 11 compares the convergence rate of elasticity for the
discrete case in Equation 5 to the continuous case in Equation
8. As shown, both cases converge for a network with 10 nodes.
Fig. 11. Comparison of the convergence rates of elasticity, from Equations 5
and 8, for a network of size N
These convergence rates are significant because they neces-
sitate few iterations. More importantly, the discrete approaches
can be abandoned for the continuous approaches to simplify
calculations without compromising accuracy.
4.3. Routing Algorithm for Elasticity
Elasticity depends on the routing algorithm selected. For this
reason, three routing approaches are explored: 1) Optimization
(heterogeneous traffic matrix), 2) Dijkstra’s Algorithm (hetero-
geneous traffic matrix), and 3) Dijkstra’s Algorithm (homoge-
neous traffic matrix). All approaches assumed homogeneous
link capacities of 1.
4.3.1. Optimization (Heterogeneous traffic matrix)
The Objective Function (Function 10) of the optimization
problem maximizes the individual flow between any pair of
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nodes. Equations 11-14 are the main constraints to the opti-
mization problem. Equation 11 ensures that each node sends δ
unit of traffic to every node, while Equation 12 represents the
balance of the incoming and outgoing traffic demands through
any node in the network. Inequality 13 represents the capacity
constraint on each link, and Equation 14 computes the utiliza-
tion of each link.
Maximize δ (10)
Subject to ∑
j∈N
flows,j,s = δ(N − 1) ∀s (11)
∑
i∈N
(flowi,j,s − flowj,i,s) = δ ∀s, j, j 6= s (12)
∑
s∈N
flowi,j,s ≤ capacityi,j ∀i, j, i 6= j (13)
utilizationi,j =
∑
s∈N
flowi,j,s ∀i, j (14)
Algorithm 1 provides elasticity using the optimization ap-
proach discussed previously.
Algorithm 1 Optimization
while Connected := True do
capacityi,j := 1
demandi,j := 0
while
∑
i,j capacityi,j 6= 0 do
Solve the optimization problem
Update the demand between nodes that are connected
with non-zero capacity links
demandi,j := demandi,j + δ
capacityi,j := capacityi,j − utilizationi,j
end while
Remove one node (or a group of nodes)
end while
4.3.2. Dijkstra’s algorithm (heterogeneous traffic matrix)
The second approach realizes Dijkstra’s algorithm. As shown
in Algorithm 2, flows traverse the shortest path from source to
destination. This algorithm has a running timeO(n2). However,
when the heterogeneous traffic matrix is considered, the running
time increases to O(n3).
4.3.3. Dijkstra’s algorithm (homogeneous traffic matrix)
This approach also revolves around Algorithm 2 and like-
wise, has a running time O(n2). However, a homogeneous traf-
fic matrix was implemented. Given these three models, Sub-
section 4.4 evaluates each and selects the most feasible.
4.4. Evaluation of Routing Models
Figure 12 shows the three networks for which elasticity was
computed: Net 1, Net 2, and Net 3. For these three networks,
Algorithm 2 Dijkstra’s algorithm
begin
S := 0; S¯ := N
d(i) :=∞ for each node i ∈ N
d(s) := 0 and pred(s) := 0
while |S| < n do
begin
let i ∈ S¯ be a node for which d (i) = min {d (j) : j ∈ s¯}
S := S ∪ {i} ;
S¯ := S¯ − {i} ;
for each (i, j) ∈ A (i) do
if d (j) > d (i) + cij then d (j) := d (j) + cij and pred(j)
:= i
end for
end
we compare the results of elasticity provided by each routing
algorithm targeting first, nodes with the highest degree and
second, nodes with highest betweenness.
Fig. 12. Three networks for which elasticity was evaluated
Figure 13 shows the throughput degradation as nodes with
highest degree are attacked in Net 1. As depicted, the optimiza-
tion approach produces the highest elasticity, followed by Di-
jkstra’s heterogeneous approach and finally, Dijkstra’s homo-
geneous approach. This trend was observed for each network
under both attack strategies. However, under certain circum-
stances where the network has low connectivity, the elasticity
results were identical for both Dijkstra’s “heterogeneous” and
optimization approach.
Fig. 13. Throughput degradation as nodes with highest degree are attacked for
Net 1. “Het” represents a heterogeneous traffic matrix and “Hom” represents
homogeneous traffic matrix.
For each of the three routing approaches, each network was
given a rank of 1, 2 or 3, based on its value for elasticity: 1 as
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the highest and 3 as the lowest. Table 2 displays the rankings
for each network under highest node degree attack. As shown,
elasticity was highest for Net 1, followed by Net 2, and finally,
Net 3, for each approach. Though the values were different
for the highest betweenness attack strategy (not shown), the
rankings were similar to that of Table 2.
Table 2
Elasticity comparison for all networks under highest node degree attack
Algorithm Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3
1 Net 1 Net 2 Net 3
2 Net 1 Net 2 Net 3
3 Net 1 Net 2 Net 3
Furthermore, we observed that the criteria for node addition
to the shortest path could potentially affect the results of elas-
ticity. More specifically, in Algorithm 2, nodes are added to the
shortest path if the following optimality condition is satisfied:
d (j) > d (i) + cij (15)
where d(j) is the distance label at node j and cij is the cost
of moving from node i to j.
However, if there are several nodes j, such that each node
satisfies this condition, the next node added to the shortest
path is selected sequentially. To investigate the impact of this
constraint on elasticity, we modify Algorithm 2 to relax the
sequential constraint by randomly selecting the next node j that
will be added to the shortest path. Algorithm 3 reflects these
changes.
Algorithm 3 Dijkstra’s “Modified” algorithm
begin
S := 0; S¯ := N ;X = 0
d(i) :=∞ for each node i ∈ N
d(s) := 0 and pred(s) := 0
while |S| < n do
begin
let i ∈ S¯ be a node for which d (i) = min {d (j) : j ∈ s¯}
S := S ∪ {i} ;
S¯ := S¯ − {i} ;
for each (i, j) ∈ A (i) do
Xi = j,∀j ∈ N which satisfy the optimality condition
jselected = rand (Xi)
then d (j) := d (j) + cij and pred(j) := i
end for
end
We conducted 100 sample runs and averaged elasticity for
each network under highest degree and highest betweenness
attacks. Our results show a negligible difference between the
elasticity results for Algorithm 2 and 3. Hence, the rankings
shown in Table 2 remain the same.
From the three algorithms, we select Dijkstra’s algorithm,
using a homogeneous traffic matrix, as the most feasible be-
cause it produces qualitatively comparable results to the other
two algorithms and has the least costly running time: O(n2).
5. Experimental Results
In this Section, we evaluate elasticity for a set of selected
topologies. First, we compute the elasticity of all networks un-
der each attack strategy and second, we implement a tradeoff
function that combines the elasticity obtained for each attack
strategy and penalizes networks for having excess links.
5.1. Elasticity of Networks Under Three Attack Strategies
In the subsequent sections, Elasticity R, Elasticity D, and
Elasticity B refer to elasticity under the following three attack
strategies:
(i) removal of random nodes (Elasticity R)
(ii) removal of highest degree nodes (Elasticity D)
(iii) removal of highest betweenness nodes (Elasticity B)
Table 3 ranks all networks in descending order of magnitude
based on the number of links and the scores for elasticity under
the three strategies. As shown, the mesh network is the most
robust under all strategies. This is expected, as it sets the upper
bound on elasticity. Under random attacks, the elasticity for the
Gi-dense and MySpace networks are in proximity to that of the
mesh network. As cost is a critical factor in network design,
it is financially sensible to implement the latter two topologies
rather than the mesh because Table 3 shows that the MySpace
and Gi-dense networks can provide about 94% of the elasticity
that the mesh provides while only using about 1% of the links.
Table 3
Networks sorted in descending order for number of links, Elasticity R (Elas.
R), Elasticity D (Elas. D), and Elasticity B (Elas. B)
Nets. links Nets. Elas. R Nets. Elas. D Nets. Elas. B
mesh 499500 mesh 0.3333 mesh 0.3333 mesh 0.3333
MySpace 10976 MySpace 0.3119 n-r 2 0.2426 Gi-dense 0.2390
Gi-dense 4505 Gi-dense 0.3111 Gi-dense 0.2082 W-S 2 0.1770
n-r 2 3781 PA 2 0.2743 MySpace 0.1721 MySpace 0.1719
W-S 2 3000 W-S 2 0.2703 W-S 2 0.1640 W-S 1 0.1260
PA 2 2964 PA 1 0.2677 n-r 1 0.1342 Gi-sparse 0.1010
Gi-sparse 2009 Gi-sparse 0.2520 W-S 1 0.1170 PA 2 0.0719
W-S 1 2000 W-S 1 0.2490 Gi-sparse 0.1143 PA 1 0.0558
PA 1 1981 n-r 2 0.2316 PA 2 0.0644 YouTube 0.0332
n-r 1 1921 Flickr 0.2211 PA 1 0.0535 Flickr 0.0315
YouTube 1576 YouTube 0.2132 YouTube 0.0371 n-r 2 0.0246
Flickr 1515 meshcore 0.1997 Flickr 0.0285 n-r 1 0.0178
meshcore 1275 HOT 2 0.1623 HOT 1 0.0129 meshcore 0.0083
HOT 2 1049 PA-sparse 0.1537 HOT 2 0.0095 HOT 1 0.0059
PA-sparse 1049 HOT 1 0.1405 Abilene 0.0093 HOT 2 0.0048
ringcore 1000 ringcore 0.1290 meshcore 0.0083 PA-sparse 0.0039
HOT 1 988 Abilene 0.1280 PA-sparse 0.0045 Abilene 0.0031
Abilene 896 n-r 1 0.1016 ringcore 0.0040 ringcore 0.0026
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The subsequent Subsections show correlations for elasticity
under the specified attack strategy.
5.1.1. Correlation Between Elasticity and Number of Links
From Table 3 it is notable that for all removal strategies the
MySpace, Gi, PA, and Watts-Strogatz networks all vie for the
highest elasticity. This phenomenon can be explained by con-
sidering the large number of links of these networks. Figures
14, 15, and 16 confirm this propensity and depict elasticity un-
der random, targeted, and highest betweenness attacks respec-
tively. In these figures, each network is assigned a symbol rep-
resentative of two classes of networks: 1) The heterogeneous
class with graphic or unshaded symbols represents networks
with a power-law distribution, and 2) the semi-regular class,
further broken down into deterministic and random networks,
are the blocked, shaded symbols and is indicative of networks
with a Poisson degree distribution. Furthermore, each symbol
within a class can be one of two sizes: The large symbols cor-
respond to the networks shown in “Full caps” in the legend and
the small symbols correspond to networks in “Lower caps.”
These Figures show that the tendency for elasticity to increase
as the number of links increase is not always the case. Thus, a
large number of links is not a necessary condition even if it is
a sufficient condition for high elasticity.
Fig. 14. Elasticity R vs number of links for each network in Table 3
Fig. 15. Elasticity D vs number of links for each network in Table 3
Table 3 shows that under random attack, elasticity can be
as low as 30.5% of the upper bound. This sharply declines to
Fig. 16. Elasticity B vs number of links for each network in Table 3
1.2% for highest degree attacks and 0.8% for highest between-
ness attacks. For this reason, the design of a robust topology
is of utmost importance to obtain high elasticity. For example,
the HOT 1 and PA-sparse networks have the same number of
links, the same number of nodes, and almost identical degree
distributions. However, their response to attacks differ [20]. Un-
der random attacks, the PA-sparse provides 9.76% more elas-
ticity than the HOT 1 network. In the PA-sparse network, low
degree nodes outnumber high degree nodes (hubs) and hence,
the probability of attacking hubs is lower than that of attack-
ing other nodes. This is also the case for the HOT 1 network.
However, the ratio of low degree nodes to hubs is higher in
the PA-sparse network than in the HOT 1 network. As a result,
Elasticity R for the PA-sparse network is higher than the HOT
1 network. For highest degree attack the elasticity provided by
both networks decreases. However, the HOT 1 topology pro-
vides about three times Elasticity D as the PA-sparse network.
The PA-sparse network is more susceptible to this attack be-
cause the hubs in this network facilitate interconnection and
are vital to the elasticity of the network. However, the hubs in
the HOT 1 network are located on the periphery and are less
critical to interconnections [18].
For highest betweenness attack, the elasticity of both net-
works decreases even more. It is notable that from highest de-
gree to highest betweenness attack, the elasticity provided by
HOT 1 exhibits a 54.3% decrease whereas that provided by PA
1 exhibits a much smaller decrease of 13.3%. This can be in-
terpreted from Figures 17 and 18 that show the betweenness
distribution for the PA-sparse and HOT 1 networks. For the
PA-sparse, nodes with the highest degrees have the highest be-
tweenness. Thus, damage incurred under highest betweenness
attacks is almost similar to that under highest degree attack.
However, for the HOT 1 network there is a large decrease in
elasticity from highest degree attack to highest betweenness
attacks because nodes with highest betweenness tend to have
lower degrees and facilitate interconnection within the network.
Thus, attacks on these nodes are more detrimental than high
degree attacks.
5.1.2. Correlation Between Elasticity and Heterogeneity
Figures 19, 20, and 21 illustrate the effect of heterogeneity on
the elasticity of a network. The interpretation of these Figures is
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Fig. 17. Betweenness distribution for the PA-sparse network
Fig. 18. Betweenness distribution for the HOT 1 network
that homogeneous networks have a proclivity for higher levels
of elasticity. These include the variations of Watts-Strogatz’s
small world models, the random models, and the near-regular
models. The implications of these results are far reaching where
network structure is concerned. For example, the W-S 2 net-
work is a representative of the random, semi-regular class of
topologies where the majority of nodes tend to have a degree
close to the average degree. Therefore, the damage incurred
under highest node degree and highest betweenness attacks is
comparable. For example, from Table 3 W-S 2 has elasticity
scores of 0.164 and 0.177 for highest degree and highest be-
tweenness attacks.
A representative of the deterministic, semi-regular networks,
n-r 1 maintains its elasticity under random and high degree
attacks. This result can be understood by the almost constant
node degree. Thus, random attacks in addition to highest de-
gree attacks, result in similar throughput degradation. However,
as nodes are removed under highest betweenness attacks, core
nodes appear and are destroyed. For n-r 1, elasticity decreases
considerably from highest degree attacks to highest between-
ness attacks by 35%. Thus, although these topologies are suffi-
ciently costly, in addition to the fact that they may fail to capture
the properties of some real world networks, their topological
structures offer remarkable resilience to attacks.
Figures 22 and 23 compare the degree distribution for W-S
2, a representative of the semi-regular class of networks, and
Abilene, a representative of the heterogeneous class of net-
works. As discussed previously, the almost constant degree for
Fig. 19. Elasticity R vs heterogeneity for each network in Table 3
Fig. 20. Elasticity D vs heterogeneity for each network in Table 3
Fig. 21. Elasticity B vs heterogeneity for each network in Table 3
the semi-regular class results in high elasticity scores. How-
ever, heterogeneous networks span a wide range of degrees and
behave differently under attacks. More precisely, based on the
“type” of heterogeneous network under investigation, the im-
pact of highest degree attacks can vary. On the one hand, net-
works like Abilene avoid cataclysmic damage under high de-
gree attack because the hubs are located on the periphery of the
network and thus, highest degree attack has minimal effect on
the overall operation of this network. However, heterogeneous
networks like PA-sparse are severely damaged because the hubs
are critical and hold the network together. Thus, homogeneity
has far reaching implications in the robustness of networks.
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Fig. 22. Node degree distribution of Watts-Strogatz 2 network
Fig. 23. Node degree distribution of Abilene network
5.1.3. Correlation Between Elasticity and Characteristic Path
Length
The characteristic path length tells the expected distance, in
number of hops, from a given source node s to a destination
node t. Figures 24, 25, and 26 show that the characteristic path
length tends to be negatively correlated with elasticity. This is
not a necessary condition as these Figures provide instances
where a network with high characteristic path length can have
a higher elasticity than a network with a smaller characteris-
tic path length. However, if the number of nodes in a given
network is kept constant as the number of links increase, path
diversity will eventually increase. As a result, network conges-
tion decreases which ultimately increases elasticity.
Fig. 24. Elasticity R vs characteristic path length for each network in Table 3
Fig. 25. Elasticity D vs characteristic path length for each network in Table 3
Fig. 26. Elasticity B vs characteristic path length for each network in Table 3
5.2. Elasticity of Networks with Tradeoff Function Applied
To compensate for the tradeoff between elasticity and number
of links, we introduce a tradeoff function Re (G) that provides
robustness with respect to elasticity. For a given network G,
our robustness measure can be computed as
Re (G) = αA+ βB + δC − γdensity′ (16)
where A, B, C, represent Elasticity R, Elasticity D, and
Elasticity B. 0 ≤ (α, β, δ, γ) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ density′ ≤ 1 and
density′ = 1− e− 12 (M−(N−1))N . The 12 factor determines the
rate at which density′ changes. α, β,δ, and γ are tolerance
parameters and as such, represent the tolerance of a network
towards random, targeted, and highest betweenness attacks.
M is the total number of links and M − (N − 1) represents
the number of excess links in a network: these are links which
exceed the threshold necessary to obtain 1 connected
component with N nodes.
This function facilitates independence for constructing net-
works based on a projected need. Thus, a network engineer
who envisions persistent, random attacks would consider a high
value of α. Similarly, β or δ would dominate where targeted
attacks or highest betweenness attacks respectively are pre-
dominant. Moreover, γ could be varied based on financial con-
straints.
Table 4 depicts the rankings of each topology with their
respective number of links and Re scores. For each network,
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Table 4
Ranking of networks after implementing the cost function Re
Networks Number of links Re
HOT 2 1049 0.1519
PA-sparse 1049 0.1374
ringcore 1000 0.1351
Abilene 896 0.1342
HOT 1 988 0.1330
W-S 1 2000 0.0982
meshcore 1275 0.0874
YouTube 1576 0.0828
Gi-sparse 2009 0.0708
Flickr 1515 0.0340
PA 1 1981 -0.0110
W-S 2 3000 -0.0210
Gi-dense 4505 -0.0684
near-regular 1 1921 -0.1206
PA 2 2964 -0.2150
near-regular 2 3781 -0.2561
MySpace 10976 -0.3388
we obtained Re for tolerance values of α = β = γ = δ = 1.
The common tolerance values facilitate an unbiased analysis of
robustness by providing equal likelihood of occurrence to each
attack strategy. In addition, these rankings represent the case
where networks are completely penalized for having excess
links and as a result, the structure of the network plays a more
significant role to determine the robustness of the network.
From this analysis, HOT 2 was the highest ranked network.
This network has only 50 excess links and thus, it virtually
avoids the penalty for the existence of excess links. Further-
more, though it exhibits power-law properties, the hubs are lo-
cated on the periphery of the network and hence, HOT 2 has an
admirable structure against targeted attacks but becomes vul-
nerable under highest betweenness attacks. However, consider-
ing the values for the tolerance parameters and number of links
discussed previously, the HOT 2 network is the most suitable.
5.3. Tradeoff Between Characteristic Path Length and
Heterogeneity
The ideal network to provide high elasticity tends to exhibit
a low score for heterogeneity and a short characteristic path
length. In all networks, the mesh has the shortest characteristic
path and the lowest score for heterogeneity and hence, it fea-
tures the highest elasticity. However, this high elasticity comes
at a very high cost which network designers are unwilling to
consider. For this reason, it is imperative to consider a tradeoff
between a short characteristic path length and a low score for
heterogeneity. Figure 27 shows a plot of heterogeneity against
characteristic path length. The colorbar (to the left) provides the
third dimension to this plot of elasticity. This plot can be inter-
preted as a decrease in the characteristic path length such that
the network becomes more homogeneous increases elasticity.
Fig. 27. Elasticity increases as characteristic path length and network hetero-
geneity decrease
6. Conclusions and Outlook
This paper endeavors to extract the characteristics of robust
complex networks. As our measure for robustness, we used
elasticity, which measures the ability of a network to maintain
its total throughput under increasing removal of nodes with re-
spective links, and theoretically derived its upper bound of 13 .
We then illustrated its utility on 18 networks from six differ-
ent network models under random, highest degree, and highest
betweenness attacks and then implemented a tradeoff function
which computes robustness with respect to elasticity.
Elasticity is defined and computed under simple assump-
tions. As an example, it is dependent on the routing algorithm
used, which can perhaps alter current network rankings. How-
ever, elasticity provides benefits which are far-reaching. More
precisely, it identifies key characteristics of robust complex net-
works: A short characteristic path length, low heterogeneity,
and strategically located links to facilitate a “homogeneous”
core such that if hubs should be added, they should be placed
on the periphery of the network to provide added resilience
against targeted attacks.
For our future work, we intend to incorporate expander
graphs in our evaluation and formulate a working definition
of the core and periphery to include details about the size and
characteristics. Armed with this knowledge, we seek to com-
bine particular graphs to determine the essential components
to increase elasticity. Finally, we will develop heuristics to
build graphs such that elasticity is maximized.
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